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IN THE SUPRE.ME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
PEARL McCONKIE PERRY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
J. ARCHIE McCONKIE and 
WILLIAM H. McCONKIE, 
Defendants and Apellants 
) 
Case No. 7811 
Brief of Respondent 
Becaus,e of the lengthy quotations set forth in appel-
lants' brief from respondent's findings of fact, respondent 
now prefers to come to grips with appellants' argument 
rather than to spend time in a preliminary statement. A 
further narration of the facts wHl necessarily appear as re-
spondent presents her argument. We desir·e to correct one 
error in appellants' preliminary statement, namely that the 
vespondent Pearl McConkie Perry is the only dissatisfied 
heir of Virtus F. McConkie. This is not true. There were 
five brothers and sitsers in this estate. Two of the brothers 
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are defendants and one sister is plaintiff. Another sister, 
Marie, testified on behalf of the defendants and the heirs 
of the other deceased sister, Leona, are represented by coun-
sel who appear for plaintiff and thave joined iwth plaintiff 
in prosecuting this action although their names do not ap-
pear in the cause. The children, therefore, line up two 
against three. Moreover, as we shall point out later, the 
sister Marie who testified on behalf of the defendants was 
far from a disinterested witness or one who stood to bene-
fit by the plaintiff's position as defendants argue. She had 
aJlready been "taken care of" by a sizeable conveyance at 
the time of the trial. 
I 
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DID VIRTUS F. McCONKIE OWN THE LaPOINT ratl 
RANCH AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH? ootl 
Her·ein we shall meet the arguments of a;ppellants ad-
vanced in Points I, II, and III of their brief. 
The LaPoint property now claimed by defendants and 
omitted from the Virtus F. M~cConkie Estate consisted of 
three separate parcel'S of land which were being purchased 
under contract of sale by one Myron Hacking and one John 
S. Hacking, both of whom were dead at the time of the 
trial herein. It is undisputed that Myron Hacking and 
John S. Hacking by instruments in writing (Plaintiff's Ex-
hibits A, B and C) assigned all of their right, title and in-
terest in and to these three parcels of land to Virtus F. 
McGonkie. The assignments were ea.ch consummated on 
the 29th day of April, H~18. Each of the assignments was 
executed in the pres,ence of a Notary PubHc, Herbert Ty-
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zack, who was also dead at the time of the trial herein. 
These facts are all admitted and indeed are clearly appa~ent 
from an examination of the said assignm·ents themselves. 
On the 29th day of April, 1918, therefo~e, the contract equi-
ties in the lands in question were vested in Virtus F. Mc-
Conkie. Virtus F. McConkie did not die until February 20, 
1920. The property described in the assignments was never 
listed or inventoried in the estate of Virtus F. McConkie, 
deceased and over 25 years later, namely shortly prior to 
February 14, 1946, the defendant J. Archie McConkie for 
the first time presented these assignm,ents to the State 
Land Board of the State of Utah and patents were issued to 
him on February 14, 1946. In the meantime the given name 
of the true assignee "Virtus F." had been removed from 
each of the instruments by ink eradicator or erasures or 
both and the given name of the defendant "J. Archie" had 
been substituted in each of said assignments. J. Percy God-
dard, a handwriting ·expert, testified without contradiction 
that the several assignmens and affidavits had been com-
pletely executed and notarized before the obliterations were 
made. While endeavoring to obliterate the name of his de-
ceased father, the clumsy J. Archie McConkie rubbed out 
part of the notary seal. The testimony of Mr. Goddard 
alone is enough to positively establish that these assign-
ments were completed, and therefor·e the interest of Myron 
Hacking and John S. Hacking in the land was effectively 
transferred to Virtus F. M·cConkie, prior to the time of the 
alteration of the docum·ents. Respondent need not depend 
entirely on this testimony, however, because the defendant 
William H. McConkie himself testified that the alteration 
was made over a year subsequent to AprH 29, 1918, namely 
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in the fall of 1919 (Trans. p. 135). We are not hound by 
that answer because the question was objectionable and 
was objected to under the dead man statute and the statute 
of frauds rbut defendants are bound by the admission that 
the alteration was subsequent to April 1918, the date of the 
execution of the assignments. 
In the analysis of this case we are then brought square-
ly to these propositions: FIRST, Title to the LaPoint prop-
erty was transferred to Virtus F. McConkie, deceased, by 
an instrument in writing and SECOND, there is no instru-
ment or conveyance whatsoever from Virtus F. McConkie 
to the defendant J. Archie McConkie, the present claimant. 
Appellants in their brief have made no argument upon this 
point and have not ev·en hinted as to how J. Archie McCon-
kie .claims he obtained ·the title to this property from his de-
ceased father, Virtus F. McConkie. There is no valid argu-
ment which they can make on this point. The dead man 
statute prevented them from testifying as to any conversa-
tion or transaction with their deceased father whi0h would 
assail his estate, and if they had been able to so testify 
they fall squarely in the teeth of the Statute of Frauds, 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, 33-5-1, which reads as fO'llows: 
No estate or interest in real property, other 
than leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor 
any trust or power over or concerning real prop-
erty or in any manner relating thereto, shall be 
created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared 
otherwis·e than by act or operation of law, or by 
deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the 
party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering 
or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent there-
unto authorized by writing. 
The contracts of sale above mentioned relate to in-
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terests in land and Virtus F. McConkie certainly had an 
equitable interest in the land described in the contracts 
of sale. The contracts of sale were all but paid out at 
the time of his death. It would take an instrument in 
writing signed by him or by his agent thereunto authorized 
in writing, to transmit that interest to J. Archie McConkie. 
There is no such writing. The defendants cannot prevail in 
this •law suit. Our position that the inte~est of Virtus F. 
McConkie in these contracts of sale is an interest in land 
wihin the meaning of the Statute of Frauds is sustained 
by Young v. Corless 56 Utah 564, 191 P. 647 and McNeil v. 
McNeil 61 Utah 141, 211 P. 988. It seems too clear to admit 
of debate that the change in the name of the assignee in 
the assignments to these contracts of sale by Archie Mc-
Con:kie would not operate as a conveyance. It follows as an 
inescapable ·Conclusion that the equitable title to the La-
Point land was vested in Virtus F. McConkie at the time 
of his death and it should have been listed as one of the 
assets of his estate, and the defendant J. Archie McConkie 
now holds legal title ther·eto in trust for the heirs of Virtus 
F. McConkie, deceased. 
This is a case where the conduct and actions of the 
defendants are most significant and an examination of the 
altered docum•ents is most revealing and the writers of thi's 
brief respectfully request the members of this court to 
personally examine the exhibits and in particular, Plaintiff's 
Exhibits A, B and C. The originals thereof which are in 
the office of the Secretary of State are even more reveal-
ing than the photostatic copies which were necessarily sub-
stituted therefor at the trial. The badges and earmarks of 
fraud, dedeption and dark dealing are strikingly apparent. 
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It is perf.ectly clear from an examination of Exhibits A, B 
and C that Virtus F. McConkie was not present when the 
alterations occurred. In particular, attention is called to 
the witness lines at the top of each assignm~ent. The first 
witness was Herbert Tyzack, who was likewise the notary 
public. On the second line there appears the surname Mc-
Conkile. In his effort to remov·e the name of his deceased 
father from any connection with the documents the defend-
ant, J. Archie McConkie, by use of ink eradicator removed 
the given name of Virtus F. McConkie on the witness line 
but left the surname of McConkie in the handwriting of 
his deceased father. The assignments would not have been 
invalidated because of the fact that the name of Virtus F. 
McConkie appeared on the witness line. The defendant 
J. Archie McConkie apparently was confused in the execu-
tion of his fraudulent scheme and he erased more than he 
need do and thereby left the surname of his deceased father 
to testify ·against him. 
Let it also be observed that these land sale contracts 
were entered into by the State of Utah with the original 
conracting parties on June 26, 1911, and that at the time of 
the death of Virtus F. McConkie the contracts were prac-
tically paid in full. The last contract paym,ents were made 
on January 5, 1921, prior to the time the inventory and ap· 
p~aisement was filed in the Virtus F. McConkie estate. If 
these contracts ever belonged to the defendants they be-
longed to them on January 5, 1921 and the patents could 
have been issued at that time. 
Why did the defendants secretly hold the contracts of 
sale until shortly prior to F·ebruary 14, 1946, a period of 
twenty-five years? 
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Plaintiff does not know when, following the death of 
Virtus F. 1\'IcConkie, these instruments were altered and 
mutilated by the defendants but in the long interim Tom 
O'Donnel, the attorney who probated the estate, Tyzack 
the notary public who notarized the signatures of Myron 
and JohnS. Hacking the assignors of the contracts of sale, 
and the assignors themselves had died. The defendants 
purposely waited until death sealed the lips of those who 
might expose their fraudulent actions. It took them twen-
ty-five years to get up enough courage to take thes~e forged 
and mutilated instruments to the State Land Board for the 
issuance of patents. 
The said documents which were at last surrendered to 
the State Land Board of the State of Utah by the unclean 
and trembling hands of J. Archie McConkie speak against 
him and position taken by him and his co-conspirator and 
co-defendant William H. McConkie more loudly and con-
clusively than any oral or written argument which might 
be advanced. The trial court was impressed by these docu-
ments and we feel certain that the members of the Supreme 
Court will be equaHy impressed if they personally examine 
the same. 
II 
DID THE ASSIGNMENT BY THE HEIRS IN 1922 AND 
THE DECREE OF THE COURT IN 1924 HAVE THE 
EFFECT OF DISTRIBUTIN~ THE LaPOINT 
PROPERTY WHICH WAS NOT LISTEn 
OR INVENTORIED IN THE ESTATE? 
Herein we meet the argument advanc·ed in Point V in 
Appellants' Brief. 
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It seems moot ev·en to argue this proposition. It is true 
the defendants in their third defense in their answer set 
forth the estate assignment execut·ed on February 25, 1922 
by the McConkie heirs (Defendants' Exhibit 1). The de-
fendants, however, do not daim that title vested in the de-
fendant J. Archie McConkie either directly or indirectly by 
virtue of defendants' Exhibit 1 but daim that by reason 
of her e~ecuting the said instrument the plaintiff "is estop-
ped from claiming any right or interest in the said property 
described in her complaint." The position of the defendants 
at all times throughout the trial and in ·their argument on 
the appeal is that title to the LaPoint property is vested in 
the defendant J. Archie McConkie because of the issuance 
of patents from the State of Utah to him upon surrender 
of the assigned contracts of sale. Nowher-e in their plead-
ings do the defendants attempt to deraign title through the 
so--called estate assignment of February 24, 1922 (Defend-
ants' Exhibit 1) but only assert an estoppel against plain-
tiff on account thereof. We submit that none of the ele-
ments of an estoppel are either pleaded or proved. The de-
fendants are not innocent parties who r-elied to their detri-
ment upon some representation or conduct on the part of 
the plaintiff. On the contrary, they are fraudulent conspira-
tors who, either alone or in conjunction with their deceased 
mother, purposely omitted the listing or inventorying of 
the LaPoint property and lead plaintiff and the other heirs 
to believe that the LaPoint property belonged to the defend-
and that no part of it belonged to the estate. They are in 
poor position to urge an estoppel bas-ed upon their own 
fraud. 
Again-a review of the documents themselves is more 
I
' ~ 
~: 
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was handled spells out what the parties intended. The in-
ventory and appraisement does not list the LaPoint prop-
erty and the entire listed estate was appraised at the sum 
of $15,040.00. Virtus F. McConkie died intestate. One-
third of the estate belonged to the surviving wife and the 
other two-thirds, approximately $10,000.00 in value, be-
longed to the five sons and daughters of deceased and ac-
cordingly and based upon said specific inventory and list-
ing of he properties of deceased the plaintiff and her sisters 
agreed to accept from the defendants the sum of $2,000.00 
each in exchange for their interest in the listed estate prop-
erty. Plaintiff joined with other heirs in executing the 
estate assignment only upon being assured that the prop-
erty of deceased was that listed in the estate file. It is true 
that an omnibus clause contained in the decree of distri-
bution will have the effect of distributing all property of 
deceased but this is not true if the heirs have been misled 
and deceived as to what assets belonged to deceas,ed. Such 
is our case. Fraud vitiates the whole transaction. The 
defendants are not assignees or grantees in this assign-
ment. The assignment is to the mother. The defend-
ants are not innocent purchasers. They have at all tim,es 
known about the fraud. The mother may or may not have 
known about it. The mother is not relying upon the estate 
assignment. She is not a party to the litigation. Only the 
perpetrators of the fraud rely on it. They seek to sustain 
their title by pointing to an instrument which was signed 
by the plaintiff when she was acting under the influence of 
the belief which she entertained that the boys and not the 
father owned this property. This belief was caused by their 
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concealments and misrepreS'entations. They seek to take 
advantage of their own wrongs. This neither law nor equity 
will sanction. 
The assignment could not operate as a conveyance 
aside from the question of fraud. The paramount object in 
the construction of a deed, and tJhe rule for the same in the 
construction of an assignment (5 Corpis Juris 943, Section 
116)), is to give effect to the intention of the parties to it. 
Such intention is to be gathered from a consideration of the 
entire instrument wri·tten in the light of circumstances un-
der which it was executed. See: Wise v. Watts, 9 Cir., 239 
P. 207, 218, 152 C.C.A. 195, certiorari denied 244 U. S. 661, 
37 S. Ct. 745, 61 L. Ed. 1376. When the members of the 
McConkie family executed the assignment transferring 
their respective inter·ests in the property of which their 
father died seized and possessed to their mother, all parties 
to the conveyance ·except the two brothers, defendants in 
this action, and probably the mother were thinking about 
the real estate and personal property which the administra-
trix had returned to the court as being property of the 
estate. At that time discussion was had with respect to 
the LaPoint property. The defendants and the mother 
stated that the LaPoint property belonged to the de-
fendants (Tr. p. 139). The assignment was made broad 
enough to cover all of the property of deceased then known 
and which is described in the inventory and appraisement 
as well as any other property which was not then known to 
them and which he owned or in which he had any interest. 
But it is so dear as almost to be self-evident that they did 
not intend the assignment to include the LaPoint property 
!( 
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now in litigation because they definitely had such property 
in mind and considered that their father had no interest 
in it. Since none of the heirs considered the LaPoint prop-
erty to be affected by the estate assignment surely the 
court will not now find and hold to the contrary. The only 
reason plaintiff agreed to receive and did receive $2,000.00 
as her share of the estate was because there was $10,000.00 
worth of property to be divided among five sons and 
daughters and one-fifth thereof equaled $2,000.00. 
The decree of distribution in the McConkie estate is 
no better than the assignment upon which it rests. The 
assignment is merged in the decree. Hopkins v. White, 20 
Calif. 234, 128 P. 780. Whatsoever title was conveyed by 
plaintiff to her mother by the assignment was confirmed 
in the mother by the decree. But no more. Since the as-
signment is merged in the decree the latter is evidence of 
nothing that is not evidenced by the former and the latter 
is open to the same construction as the former and is also 
subject to the same infirmities. Since the assignment is 
vitiated by fraud the decree is likewise so vitiated. The 
general principles applicwble to the construction of judg-
ments are applied in construing an order or decree of distri-
bution. Judgments must be construed as a whole. In case 
of ambiguity or doubt the entire record may be examined 
or considered, Snow v. West, 37 Utah 528, 110 P. 52. Since 
the court may examine the entire record to determine the 
meaning of the. decree of distribution it may look to the 
assignment which is the basis of the decree and in so look-
ing it will see that the LaPoint property is not included. 
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III 
IS PLAINTIFF BARREn FROM RECOVE:RY HEREIN 
BECAUSE OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
OR LACHES? 
Defendants contend that plaintiff knew or should have 
known of her father's claim or interest in the LaPoint prop-
erty at the time the estate was being probated and there-
for·e her right to recovery is barred by the Statute of Lim-
itations. The Statute of Limitations which was then ap-
plicable to our action was that of Utah Code Annotated 
1943, 104-2-24 (3). The three-year statute of limitations 
governs fraud cases. In 1947 the plaintiff first heard some-
thing was irregular; she actually learned of the fraud in 
April, 1949, and started her action in November 1949. 
Defendants say plaintiff must have known her father 
owned the LaPoint property because it is set forth in her 
complaint in the earlier action that the property was pur-
posely omitted from the estate by agreement of the heirs 
to save expens-es. Plaintiff denies there was any such agree-
ment. (Tr. p. 214-217). Defendants do not claim there was 
any such agreement among the heirs. All parties agree 
there was no such understanding. It is, therefore, idle to 
spend time arguing this contention. 
Defendants, however, say that we should hav·e mis-
trusted them and their mother, should not have believed 
the representations made by all three, but s·hould have con-
ducted an independent investigation and commenced an 
action when the estate was in probate. Let us look at the 
situation which prevailed. The defendants were grown men 
and were both unmarried and immediately following their 
father's death they, along with their mother, took over the 
' )' 
~ t I 
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handling of the affairs. On the other hand the plaintiff at• 
that time was divorced and had several small children. 
She relied implicitly in the representations and good faith 
of her brothers and her mother. Her mother was appointed 
administratrix but the actual handling of the property and 
affairs was more or less left to the defendants (Tr. p. 136). 
The defendant J. Archie McConkie testified moreover that 
a partnership relation existed between him, his co-defendant 
and their mother from the time of their father's death until 
the year 1937 (Tr. p. 246). The defendant William H. Mc-
Conkie stated that he and his brother assisted their mother 
in handling the affairs of their father after his death (Tr. 
p. 105). The defendants lived with their mother at all 
times following their father's death in the year 1920 to the 
year 1937 (Tr. p. 106, 161). In the several conferences 
which lead up to the execution of the assignment in the 
estate (Defendants' Exhibit 1) the mother .stated to the 
heirs which property belonged to deceased and which prop-
erty belonged to the boys (Tr. p. 116) and when the mother 
made the statements the defendants didn't say anything to 
the contrary (Tr. p. 139). The mother stated that the La-
Point property had been bought for the boys (Tr. p. 147). 
That language in itself is significant. She didn't say the 
boys bought it-she said it had been bought for the boys. 
Was the plaintiff, who at this time was burdened with 
the problem of supporting herself and her minor children, 
unreasonable in relying upon the representations made by 
her own mother and by her elder brothers who were looking 
after the affairs of the estate? W·e say she was not un-
reasonable and that there was nothing to excite her atten-
tion until word leaked out that the patents had finally been 
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issued. On the contrary, there was a relationship of trust 
and confidence between plaintiff and her mother and her 
brothers. There was not only a blood relationship but the 
mother with the active management of the brothers was 
administering the estate as a fiduciary. Plaintiff believed 
them and relied upon them (Tr. p. 32 et passim). Had she 
gone to the records at the County Court House or at the 
State Capitol she would have found no instruments which 
would have indicated that her father was the owner of the 
LaPoint land. The equity in the land was not being taxed 
in 1920, 1921 or 1922 (Tr. p. 83). The contracts of sale at the 
State Capitol stood in the names of John S. and Myron 
Hacking. The brothers had worked on the LaPoint land 
with their father, and when the administratrix who was 
also her mother told the plaintiff the land belonged to the 
boys the plaintiff acted reasonably in believing that it did 
belong to the boys and not to her father. As defendants 
argue in their brief plaintiff believed the defendants owned 
the LaPoint property. 
There is a conflict in the testimony between the plain-
tiff on the one hand and her sister, Marie Johnson, and the 
latter's husband, Virden R. Johnson, on the other hand. 
Defendants in their brief place great stress upon the testi-
mony from the "disinterested witness," Marie Johnson. She 
was such a willing witness that it required the combined 
efforts of the court, opposing counsel and her own attorneys 
to restrain her enthusiasm at the trial (Tr. bottom half of p. 
185 and top half of p. 186). Marie Johnson, however, after 
the pot began to boil in 1947, received a deed to a valuable 
piece of property from the mother. This deed was executed 
July 19, 1948 (Tr. p. 251). It was the co-def.endants who 
,::u 
,,_,., 
,'.I. 
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actually paid the money to construct the home situated 
on this property. They expended for the improvements 
alone the sum of $3,800.00 (Tr. p. 143). Marie Johnson and 
her husband, Virden R. Johnson, had been rewarded by the 
conveyance to them of this improved land, and it is against 
this background that the interest and testimony of Marie 
and Virden R. Johnson was evaluated by the trial court and 
must be evaluated upon appeal. 
It is little wonder that the trial court was not impressed 
by the vacillating testimony of the defendant J. Archie 
McConkie. See the transcript at page 246: 
Q. (By Mr. Jensen) Following your father's 
death state whether or not you and your brother 
Will and your mother operated as co-partners? 
A. We did, we worked together. 
Q. And you continued to work as. co-partners, 
the three of you, until your mother's death, did 
you? 
A. No sir, until '37 about. 
Q. Did you have the LaPoint property in-
cluded in that partnership? 
A. Yes, we had that along too. 
Q. That was right within the partnership, 
was it? 
A. No, no. 
Q. What was your answer, yes or no? 
A. No sir, that wasn't exactly along with the 
rest of the stuff. 
it. 
Q. Wasn't exactly? 
A. No, it wasn't partnership along with all of 
Q. You claimed that as your own, did you? 
A. Well,-
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Q. Answer that yes or no. 
A. Well, it would be yes and no. Will had an 
interest in it too. 
This defendant's attorney only risked four questions 
with him upon direct examination (Tr. p. 238). 
The conflict in testimony was resolved in favor of the 
plaintiff. The trial court heard and saw the witness·es, ob-
served their demeanor and believed one against several. 
Its decision in so doing should not be disturbed. 
IV 
IS PLAINTIFF'S ACTION IN EQUITY MAINTAINABLE 
WITHOUT REOPENING THE VIRTUS F. 
McCONKIID ESTATE? 
Herein we meet Point VI of Defendants Brief. 
At the outset we point out that the want of legal ca-
pacity to sue is waived unless it is attacked by the answer 
or under the old rules by demurrer or answer. Chamberlain 
et al v. Larsen et al (Utah) 29 P. 2d 355; Tooele Meat & 
Storage Co. v. Fite Candy Co., 57 Utah 1, 116 P. 427. So 
it is with waiver of nonjoinder or misjoinder: Sidney Ste-
vens Implement Co. v. South Ogden Land, Building & Im-
provement Co., 20 Utah 267, 58 P. 843, also Salt Lake City 
v. Salt Lake Investment Co., 43 Utah 181, 134 P. 603. Nei-
ther by demurrer or answer have the defendants raised any 
question with respect to the form of this action. Capacity 
to sue must be raised by the pleadings, otherwise it is 
waived: 
"Moreover, no objection was made at the prop-
er time and in the proper manner to plaintiff's ca-
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pacity to sue either by a demurrer or answer and 
therefore if there had been any merit to this con-
tention it was waived." Cobb v. Hartenstein, 47 
Utah 17 4, 152 P. 424. 
In the case now before the court the probate proceed-
ings were conducted from 1920 to June 2, 1924, when the 
administratrix was discharged. Notice to creditors was 
given and all creditors paid. To reopen the estate would 
not only have been a useless ceremony but also a diminish-
ing one inasmuch as by the reappointment of an adminis-
trator a needless expense would have been entailed. The 
only question is where rests the title to the property. The 
court had full power and jurisdiction to enter its decree 
thereon. 
Defendants contend that plaintiff's suit is a collateral 
attack upon the Decree of Distribution in the probate of the 
Estate of Virtus F. McConkie, which may not he main-
tained; and they cite lntermill v. Nash, 94 Utah 271, 75 Pac. 
2d 157, to support their theory that the attack of the plain-
tiff in the instant case is collateral. However, the case of 
lntermill v. Nash, supra, recognizes the requirement that 
the res must be before the court in order that the judgment 
import verity, prove itself, and he invulnerable to attack 
by any indirect assaults. In the instant case, the res was 
not before the court in the probate of the Estate of Virtus 
F. McConkie, but rather was deliberately and fraudulently 
concealed from the court. 
A decree of distribution does not constitute a bar to an 
equitable action based upon fraud. See In re Madsen's Es-
tate, 87 Pac. 2d 903: 
"It is * * * well settled that where, through 
extrinsic fraud practiced in probate proceedings, 
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distributees have obtained property to which they 
were not entitled, equity will do justice not by 
overthrowing the decree of distribution but by de-
claring the distributees hold the property in trust 
for the rightful owners. * * * This character of re-
lief is very common in the matter of fraudulent 
probate proceedings. The order or decree from the 
effect of which relief is sought cannot constitute 
a bar to such equitable action. As has been said, it 
is solely because of the order or decree, collaterally 
unassaila}ble and valid on its face, that the equi-
table jurisdiction is necessary and exists." 
In the case of Simonton et al v. Los Angeles Trust & 
Savings Bank, et al, 221 Pac. 368, an executrix fraudulently 
and designedly concealed certain shares of stock from the 
notice, attention and consideration of .the probate court, 
and the same was not mentioned, reported or accounted for 
by the executrix. Suit was brought by one of the heirs who 
had no knowledge of the existence of said property, and the 
question of intrinsic and extrinsic fraud was raised. Syl. 
1 concisely states the ruling of the court : 
"The fraudulent concealment, by a testator's wid-
ow, of the common property, from the attention of 
the probate court in the administration of testa-
tor's estate, was extrinsic fraud, and a court of 
equity has jurisdiction to interpose and furnish ap-
propriate relief from the final decree of distribu-
tion obtained by the employment of that fraud." 
It is apparently the further contention of the defend-
ants that plaintiff's mode of procedure is wrong, and that 
she should have proceeded to endeavor io vacate the Decree 
of Distribution in the Estate of Virtus F. McConkie. 
The probate court is without power to reopen or vacate 
its decree of distribution after expiration of the time to ap-
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peal. Mter six months has elapsed from the filing of a de-
cree, the court is without jurisdiction, and hence powerless 
to interfere with the decree; and the decree can be assailed 
only in an independent equitable action, and for proper cause 
such as prompted the instant action. Vol. 4 Bancroft's Pro-
bate Practice 2d Ed., Sec. 1171, p. 485; and Sec. 1176, p. 495. 
And see: Noyes et al v. Agee, 53 Utah 360, 178 Pac. 753. 
A person defrauded by the acts of an executor or ad-
ministrator is not without means to correct the injustice. 
Section 102-14-23, U.C.A. 1943, sets out a remedy to the 
person so injured : 
Mistakes in settlement may be corrected at any 
time before final settlement and discharge, and 
after that time by an action in equity, on such 
showing as will justify the interference of the 
court." 
And see: In Re Rice's Estate. Rice v. Rice et al, 111 Utah 
428, 182 Pac. 2d 111, quoting Cooley in his Law of Torts, 
3rd Edition, p. 934, on the subject of "Wrongs by Decep-
tion," as follows: 
" * * * It can never be either wise or safe to mark 
out specific boundaries within which deceits shall 
be dealt with, but beyond which they shall have 
impunity; but each case must be considered on its 
own facts, and every case will have peculiarities of 
its own, by which it may be judged." 
Judged by the evidence in the instant action, the Plain-
tiff has been deceived and defrauded to her prejudice, and 
a grave injustice would be perpetrated if after establishing 
that fact she was yet denied relief. 
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ARGUMENT 
ON 
PLAINTIFF'S CROSS APPEAL 
Plaintiff has cross appealed from the lower court's 
finding and decision that the plaintiff failed in her proof 
that Virtus F. McConkie at the time of his death was the 
owner of 300 shares of the capital stock of the Whiterocks 
Irrigation Company. We believe the evidence is such that 
the lower court should also have impressed a trust upon 
this water stock in the hands of the defendant J. Archie 
McConkie. The 300 shares of stock in question represented 
the water which was used for irrigation of the LaPoint 
property. It is hardly to be expected this water would be 
o"wned hy one person and the land by another and all of 
the evidence adduced at the trial points to the fact that 
Virtus F. McConkie was also the owner of the said shares 
of stock. 
The secretary of the Whiterocks Irrigation Company, 
Mrs. Woolley, was called as a witness, and she produced the 
minute book as well as certain other records of the com-
pany. From these it is definitely established that Virtus F. 
McConkie was an officer and director of the Whiterocks 
Irrigation Company shortly prior to his death on February 
20, 1920. He was nominated and elected a director at the 
annual stockholders' meeting of December 13, 1919 (Tr. 
p. 72). It was stipulated at the trial that a person must 
be a stockholder in order to be a director in said company 
(Tr. p. 79). It also appears that as late as 1924 the assess-
ment records of the Whiterocks Irrigation Company dis-
closed that said 300 shares of stock were listed and assessed 
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againt Virtus F. McConkie. The names of J. Archie McCon-
kie and William H. McConkie were not listed in connectio~ 
with this 300 shares of stock and the records clearly dis-
close that the stock was being listed and treated as the 
property of Virtus F. McConkie. 
Certificate No. 12 in the Whiterocks Irrigation Com-
pany which was originally issued to John S. Hacking was 
never presented for reissuance in the name of Virtus F. 
McConkie, and it was not until the month of December 1944 
that Archie McConkie secured affidavits as to the loss of 
this certificate and presented them to the Whiterocks Irri-
gation Company. Again we request the members of the 
court to carefully examine the affidavit ·signed by John S. 
Hacking (Plaintiff's Exhibit D). As this affidavit was 
first prepared hy Archie McConkie it read that John S. 
Hacking in the year 1915 sold to Archie McConkie 300 
shares of the capital stock of the Whiterocks Irrigation 
Company. Apparently the old man JohnS. Hacking refused 
to execute such an affidavit which had been pres·ented to 
him and the same was partly erased and written over so 
that it now correctly reads that in the year 1915 John S. 
Hacking sold to V. F. McConkie (also known as Virtus F. 
McConkie) said 300 shares. The conclusive evidence there-
fore in the files of the Whiterocks Irrigation Company is the 
affidavit of John S. Hacking presented to said company by 
the defendant J. Archie McConkie to the effect that this 300 
shares of water stock had been sold by John S. Hacking to 
Virtus F. McConkie and not to J. Archie McConkie (Archie). 
It is also significant that it was not until the year 
1944, shortly prior to the time the altered and mutilated 
real estate assignments were presented to the State Land 
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Board, that J. Archie McConkie went to the Whiterocks 
Irrigation Company to have a certificate issued in the 
place of one which had been lost or destroyed. If this stock 
at all times since 1915 belonged to J. Archie McConkie, as 
he recites in his own affidavit (Plaintiff's Exhibit E), 
would not J. Archie McConkie have presented the certificate 
to the irrigation company, or if he could not find it would 
he not have then and there filed affidavits as to loss and 
had the certificate issued in his own name? He sat by as 
the stock assessments on these 300 shares came out in the 
name of his father. They were so issued, for example, in 
the year 1924 (Tr. p. 75). 
The fraud is all woven out of the same piece of yarn. 
Both the land and the water belonged to the deceased fath-
er, and the conspiring sons sat by for approximately twen-
ty-five years before they presented the altered real estate 
assignments and the fraudulent affidavit executed by J. 
Archie McConkie for the transfer of the water. The cor-
rected affidavit of John S. Hacking, who was also dead by 
trial time, as to the ownership of the said water is the best 
evidence in the record on this particular subject. Virtus F. 
McConkie owned this water stock. On the strength of it 
he was elected as a director in the Whiterocks Irrigation 
Company. The same was assessed in his name and remained 
on the assessment rolls in his name for almost twenty-five 
years. Unfortunately, at the time of the trial the notary 
on plaintiff's Exhibit D, Wallace Calder, was also dead. He 
died in 1945 (Tr. p. 88). 
Why did the two McConkie brothers at about the time 
the lawsuit was started become apprehensive as to what the 
records of the Whiterocks Irrigation Company might dis-
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close? The only purpose they would have in visiting the 
secretary and reading the minutes would be to learn if there 
was anything revealed therein which might be adverse to 
their position (Tr. p. 73). Mr. Perry, the husband of the 
plaintiff, also examined these records before and after they 
were checked by the defendants, and at the second exam-
ination it was discovered that some of the pages from the 
record books had been torn out and in particular a set of 
minutes which referred to the election of Virtus F. McCon-
kie to the Board of Directors of the Whiterocks Irrigation 
Company (Tr. p. 87). Although the record is not positive 
on this point, we believe the defendants tore out these pages 
to further bolster their fraudulent position that the water 
stock belonged to them and not to their father. 
Neither of the defendants made any pretext of ex-
plaining how J. Archie McConkie acquired the stock in the 
Whiterocks Irrigation Company notwithstanding the fact 
that the affidavit of John S. Hacking recited that the stock 
had been sold to the father, Virtus F. McConkie. In light 
of this silence of the defendants, and upon a fair considera-
tion of all of the documentary evidence pertaining to the 
ownership of the 300 shares of stock in the Whiterocks 
Irrigation Company, we submit that the lower court should 
also have impressed a trust upon this water stock in the 
hands of the defrauding sons and that this court should 
now reverse the decision of the lower court to that extent. 
CONCLUSIONS 
From the foregoing it is to be concluded: 
1. At the time of the death of Virtus F. McConkie 
there was vested in him the equitable title to what has been 
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referred to herein as the LaPoint property, and the same 
should have been listed as one of the assets of the estate of 
Virtus F. McConkie, deceased. The trial court was clearly 
right in declaring the defendant J. Archie McConkie a trus-
tee of the LaPoint lands for the use and benefit of the 
heirs of Virtus F. McConkie, deceased, and in requiring 
him and his brother and partner William H. McConkie to 
account. 
2. The assignment by the heirs in 1922 was based 
upon and secured by fraudulent representation, and that 
the decree of the court in 1924 did not have the effect of 
distributing the LaPoint property to the respondents' mo-
ther. 
3. The plaintiff is not barred from recovery be-
cause of the Statute of Limitations or laches. 
4. Plaintiff's action in equity and her showing of ex-
trinsic fraud practiced in the probate proceeding justified 
the interference of the court. 
5. The lower court should have impressed a trust 
upon the 300 shares of the capital stock of the Whiterocks 
Irrigation Company which represented the water used for 
the irrigation of the LaPoint property. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE S. JOHNSON and 
THERALD. N. JENSEN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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